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Imperial classifications and anti-colonial resistance in North 
Africa 
 
 
There is a tendency in much of the recent scholarship on trans-
Mediterranean relations to privilege Europe. This proclivity 
takes a range of related forms. The continent, which is 
frequently elided with the EU, is either made the object of 
analysis, used to frame the study of the region, or assumed or 
argued to be the decisive influence on the political and economic 
development of the southern Mediterranean. Intra-regional 
interactions are explicitly or implicitly presented from a 
European perspective. Europe’s interests, objectives and 
anxieties habitually determine both the topic of discussion and 
the direction of debate. This helps explain the literature’s 
focus on security and, in particular, such issues as Islamist 
terrorism, migration, and oil and gas. For these are Europe’s 
primary concerns and are routinely cited as crucial influences 
on its behaviour towards the southern Mediterranean both before 
and since the Arab Spring.1 Furthermore, many diagnoses of the 
EU’s failure to anticipate or react quicker and more effectively 
to the protests attribute its lacklustre response to internal 
deficiencies or tensions,2 to lapses in the bloc’s will, capacity 
and organisation, rather than to anything beyond its direct 
control. Thus, the EU is frequently portrayed as instrumental 
to its neighbours’ progress, as the main determiner, either by 
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how it acts or in what it fails to do, of the region’s political 
and economic development. 
 The recent literature’s privileging of Europe and elision 
of the continent with the EU leads much of it to focus on inter-
governmental interactions when examining trans-Mediterranean 
relations.3 While many studies look at the composition and 
activities of a range of non-state actors, including civil 
society groups, opposition parties and protest coalitions, they 
do so mainly in domestic contexts.4 Few trace and analyse the 
links these bodies have to organisations elsewhere in the 
southern Mediterranean. And fewer still investigate their ties 
to similar outfits in Europe, or their influence on the 
continent’s leaders, policy-makers and governments. 
Individually and collectively, the books by Mathilde von 
Bülow, Liat Kozma and Odile Moreau and Stuart Schaar help counter 
this tendency in three important ways. The first is by 
contextualising the recent political and public debates over 
trans-Mediterranean migration. Von Bülow meticulously charts the 
extent to which French, German and other European governments 
of the 1950s and 1960s viewed North African migrants to their 
countries as threats to public order and state security, and the 
souring effect these fears had on relations between the 
continent’s capitals. Kozma examines the mounting concerns of 
Europe’s governments in the early twentieth century over the 
trafficking of women and girls as sex workers around the region, 
and their efforts to prevent and police the cross-border 
3 
 
movement of unaccompanied females. And Moreau and Schaar’s 
contributors chart the lives and careers of selected North 
African and Middle Eastern figures many of whom not only were 
determined to limit and counter European political and cultural 
influence in the southern Mediterranean, but also drew on Islam 
to promote and gain local support for their causes. All of these 
works show that Europe’s concerns over migration from the 
southern Mediterranean are longstanding, and that many of the 
responses to this movement of people devised and implemented by 
the continent’s current leaders and governments have evolved out 
of measures and plans developed by their predecessors from the 
late nineteenth century onwards. 
 The second way in which these works help counter the recent 
literature’s tendency to privilege Europe is by paying direct 
attention to the interests and behaviour of North African and 
Middle Eastern actors. Von Bülow’s study centres on the 
Federation of France (Féderation de France, FF), the European 
wing of the National Liberation Front (Front de Liberation 
Nationale, FLN), which orchestrated and led the armed struggle 
for Algeria’s independence. Kozma’s point of departure is the 
individuals involved in the sex trade in Europe’s southern 
Mediterranean territories, and the efforts of the responsible 
imperial power to manage these persons. And Moreau and Schaar’s 
contributors chronicle either the lives and activities of 
hitherto unheralded figures who helped stimulate and marshal 
national awareness and anti-colonial resistance in North Africa 
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and the Middle East, or previously neglected episodes in the 
careers of better known personalities opposed to Europe’s 
influence and authority over the region. Thus, each of these 
works makes the southern Mediterranean the object of their 
enquiry rather than Europe. 
 And the third way in which these works help counter this 
tendency is by focusing not solely on governments and their 
interactions with one another, but the activities and political 
influence of non-governmental groups, bodies, organisations and 
figures. While Von Bülow assiduously traces the efforts of 
successive French governments to compel their West German 
counterparts to take an ever-harder line against the FLN, and 
Bonn’s efforts to placate both Paris and the newly independent 
countries of North Africa and the Middle East, she also details 
the development and execution of the FF’s strategy in Europe. 
And even though Kozma compares the attempts of the French and 
British imperial governments to control both the movement of 
unaccompanied females and the spread of venereal diseases around 
the Mediterranean, she also chronicles the role of the League 
of Nations in coordinating the international response to the 
trafficking of women and girls, and the experiences of specific 
individuals and groups involved in the cross-border prostitution 
networks. And although Moreau and Schaar’s contributors pay some 
attention to how the French and British imperial authorities 
ruled their respective territories in North Africa and the 
Middle East, their main objects of focus remain their chosen 
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cultural, nationalist and anti-colonial leaders. Furthermore, 
each of these works spends at least some time considering the 
cross-border interactions of their respective non-governmental 
actors. 
 These works are bound to one another not only by the 
similarity of their contributions to the literature on trans-
Mediterranean relations, but also by their revelation of the 
opportunities to resist colonial rule generated by the imperial 
powers’ classification of particular individuals and groups 
operating in and out of North Africa and the Middle East. Despite 
their different subject matters, each study looks at how these 
designations allowed nationalist bodies and figures to 
challenge, circumvent and, thereby, destabilise colonial 
authority. They also show that these opportunities were created 
as much by the act of classifying as the content of the 
classifications themselves, as anti-colonial forces explored and 
exploited the limits of particular designations to pursue 
courses of action that the imperial powers were actively trying 
to close down. Furthermore, none of the studies identifies their 
exposure of these opportunities as one of their core objectives. 
Rather, the insights they offer are corollaries of other lines 
of enquiry they each take. 
 As part of her study into the efforts of successive French 
governments to contain and counter the FLN’s campaign in Europe, 
von Bülow highlights and examines the consequences of several 
vital designations. One of the most important at which she looks 
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is that of the conflict itself. Despite deploying hundreds of 
thousands of troops to Algeria during the nearly eight years of 
fighting, the French government never formally declared war on 
the FLN.5 Its forces were instead involved in what was officially 
described as a police action.6 In categorising its armed struggle 
with the FLN this way, Paris sought not only to downplay the 
scale of the confrontation and minimise the legitimacy of its 
adversary, but also to prevent and deter the involvement of 
external actors, including its own allies.7 Indeed, one of the 
main reasons the French government adopted this classification 
was to reinforce its claim that the conflict was a solely 
domestic security matter in which the international community 
had no right to intervene. 
 In her study, von Bülow charts the effect of this decision 
on the French government’s efforts to disrupt the flow of weapons 
and equipment from Europe to the FLN’s fighters in North Africa. 
In particular, she highlights the ways in which Paris’s 
designation of the conflict impaired its ability to mount a more 
effective blockade of the enemy’s forces. She notes that without 
a declaration of war, the French authorities could not invoke 
the rights of either pursuit or riposte.8 And while they were 
prepared on occasion to break international law and board and 
impound ships and property registered and belonging to West 
German companies and citizens, Cold War political considerations 
prevented them from doing the same to Warsaw Pact vessels and 
goods. These restrictions, born of its definition of the 
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conflict, undermined the French government’s attempts to starve 
the FLN of the means to keep fighting. As a result, and as von 
Bülow details, the number of weapons in the possession of the 
National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération Nationale, ALN) 
units in Tunisia and Morocco,9 increased from 10,000 and 1,500 
respectively in February 1959 to 60,000 and 7,000 in May 1960.10 
 Paris instigated this blockade partly in response to the 
effects of another ambiguity over what constituted weapons of 
war.11 According to von Bülow, one of the most important tasks 
in which FF operatives in West Germany were engaged was the 
procurement of arms for their ALN comrades in North Africa. 
Under this assignment, these envoys had to identify and liaise 
with dealers who were willing to circumvent Bonn’s ban on the 
export to Algeria of munitions of an overtly military function 
(Kriegswaffen). One of the ways in which some suppliers got 
around this prohibition was by making just enough modifications 
to the weapons they were providing to be able to claim that they 
were designed and intended for civilian use (Relativwaffen). 
While Paris continued to denounce such classificatory chicanery, 
by these means the FF succeeded in procuring hundreds of firearms 
and thousands of rounds of ammunition for its forces. 
 Another equally important designation explored by von Bülow 
is that of nationality, of who was – and who was not – considered 
a citizen of France. The conditions and corollaries of this 
particular classification were instrumental to the evolution of 
the Algerian nationalist movement and the FLN’s resort to 
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violence. Since the extension and consolidation of French rule 
over Algeria from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the 
territory’s Muslim majority had been subject to a range of 
discriminatory and humiliating provisions that afforded them 
fewer civil rights than either the nearly one million Europeans 
who eventually settled there or the Metropolitan French.12 
Despite the occasional efforts of well-meaning ministers and 
governments in Paris, and administrations in Algiers to redress 
this imbalance, many of these provisions remained in force until 
the final days of Algérie française, largely at the insistence 
of the settler community. Nevertheless, from the 1930s onwards, 
the authorities in Paris and to a lesser extent Algiers grew 
increasingly alarmed at the effect this discrimination was 
having on both the direction of development of the Algerian 
nationalist movement and the country’s international reputation 
as an enlightened and liberal power. In the wake of the Second 
World War and Sétif and Guelma massacres of 1945,13 therefore, 
Paris began to pursue more actively a range of reforms intended 
to improve the political and civil rights of the Muslim majority. 
 With the start of the war of liberation, however, Paris 
faced an intractable dilemma. On the one hand, it recognised 
that granting Algeria’s Muslims comparable civil rights to those 
of their European compatriots was vital to winning their support 
or, in the very least, to preventing them from siding with the 
FLN. Yet on the other, it actively restricted and infringed some 
of these rights as part of its campaign against the FF. This led 
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Paris to pressure Bonn to treat the growing number of Algerians 
living in West Germany as French citizens in some instances and 
as not in others. While this approach arguably helped Paris to 
monitor and control the movement of Muslim Algerians in some 
ways, it also had significant drawbacks. Not least, as the legal 
confusion it engendered in West Germany helped ensure that the 
country’s authorities rarely felt able to pursue the FLN members 
and supporters residing there with enough vigour to satisfy 
their French counterparts. Von Bülow details how FF operatives 
succeeded in turning this classificatory tension to their 
advantage and thereby established West Germany as one of their 
most important bases from which to mount their European 
campaign.14 
The allocation of rights on the basis of civil status is a 
core theme of Kozma’s book as well. She charts and analyses the 
ways in which Europe’s imperial powers tried to control the 
movement and social interactions of certain categories of women 
who lived and worked in their respective territories. The first 
such group she examines comprised women and girls whom Western 
governments deemed vulnerable to the immoral machinations of the 
pimps and procurers who worked the Mediterranean. To help 
protect them from such predatory forces, these governments, in 
collaboration with the League of Nations, devised and introduced 
a raft of legal measures that constrained the ability of young 
and unaccompanied females to travel overseas. To prevent women 
and girls from being encouraged or forced into prostitution, 
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therefore, Western governments and the League tried to reduce 
their freedom of movement. Yet, as Kozma notes, these attempts 
were of only limited effectiveness as procurers continually 
found ways to circumvent these restrictions and spirit them from 
one country and to another.15 
The second category of females that Kozma examines is made 
up of prostitutes who lived and worked in several North African 
and Levantine cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. These women were subject to a range of conditions and 
constraints that greatly affected what they could do and where 
they could go. In France, as in much of the rest of mainland 
Europe, prostitution was considered an unavoidable corollary of 
male sexuality. As such, prostitutes and brothels were permitted 
to operate legally and semi-openly under state supervision. This 
attitude, along with the broader principles of the regulatory 
regimen to which it gave rise, were gradually extended to 
France’s territories overseas including those in North Africa 
and the wider Middle East.  
 Thus, by the early twentieth century prostitutes and 
brothels in the Maghreb were only allowed to work and operate 
legally if they satisfied a range of official requirements. For 
individual women, these included registering as a prostitute 
with the local authorities and submitting to regular health 
checks with a state-approved physician. Any woman who refused 
to meet these obligations could be arrested, tried, fined and 
imprisoned. Registering as a prostitute, therefore, imposed a 
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unique array of responsibilities on those forced to take on this 
status. And once acquired, it often proved difficult to discard 
as, ‘to change their official categorization, women had to apply 
to the authorities and convince them that they had repented, 
providing a guarantor or proving that they had married’.16  
 Some colonial officers in French North Africa also imposed 
restrictions on where prostitutes could live and work, and the 
appearance of the premises in which they resided. In the early 
1920s, the city authorities in Casablanca built a new bespoke 
red-light district that was specifically designed to reduce the 
visibility and control the movement of its residents. The 
lodgings there all looked the same and were ‘connected by 
identical courtyards and doors.’ The buildings had ‘only one 
entrance [which was] protected by a double door, and no external 
sign[s] or emblem[s]. The windows [had] to remain closed at all 
times, and those overlooking … neighbors had to be covered by 
matte frosted glass’.17 The women who lived there could leave 
the district but once a week and only then if they had official 
permission to do so. To move to another part of the city they 
had to apply for and obtain a clean bill of health from the 
local authorities. And to move further afield, they also had to 
gain the approval of medical officers in the place to which they 
wanted to relocate. As Kozma explains, prostitutes in France’s 
North African and Middle Eastern territories were subjected to 
a raft of highly restrictive and invasive regulations which they 
then struggled to have rescinded.  
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 The legal-medical experience of these women and girls was 
taken up by members of the rapidly growing feminist movements 
in France and Britain. By the early 1930s, campaigners in both 
countries were calling for the abolition of these regulations 
as a prelude to ending prostitution in the overseas territories. 
While British feminists were more successful in achieving this 
objective – largely because, in gaining suffrage earlier, they 
had greater influence on their country’s political process and 
colonial policies – both they and their French counterparts 
relied on paternalistic arguments to make their case. For they 
maintained that these regulations and prostitution more broadly 
were incompatible with the aims of the civilising missions to 
which their respective imperial governments were ostensibly 
committed. Thus, as Kozma explains, the lives and experiences 
of female sex workers in North Africa and the Levant were central 
to the increasingly intense yet complex debates that took place 
in France and Britain and their respective overseas territories 
over how best to challenge the colonial relations that existed 
between men and women, and, more ambiguously, Europeans and the 
peoples whose lands they had colonised and settled. 
 The rights and status of North Africa’s colonised peoples 
is also a central theme of Moreau and Schaar’s edited volume. 
Each of their contributors, charts and examines the life and 
career of an individual who either fomented and led local 
resistance to European rule in one or other North African 
territory, or influenced the development of indigenous 
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nationalism somewhere in the region. For some of these figures, 
challenging imperial power and authority was a primary 
objective. For others, it was a corollary of their efforts to 
secure either their own interests or those of a particular 
community or constituency. Collectively these contributions 
highlight and, in some instances, interrogate, the advantages 
these figures derived from manipulating and exploiting European 
designations and classifications, and anti-colonial 
expectations. 
 The ways in which each of these individuals did so, however, 
varied significantly. As Odile Moreau explains in her chapter, 
Aref Taher Bey spent the years leading up to the Great War 
fighting a rear-guard action against the growing French and 
Italian influence over Morocco and Tripolitania respectively. 
His primary goal in both instances was less the preservation of 
each territory’s mainly Muslim population from encroaching 
Christian rule, and more the defence of Ottoman interests in the 
region including, in the case of Tripolitania, maintaining 
Constantinople’s suzerainty over the province. And despite 
claiming to a French journalist that pan-Islamism was largely 
concocted by Europe’s imperial powers to justify their 
interventions in North Africa, he was closely associated with a 
number of trans-national religious groups that helped stimulate 
and orchestrate local Muslim resistance to European interference 
and rule in the region.18 
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 Aref Taher Bey’s motivations, as well as some of his key 
experiences, were similar to those of Enver Pasha, another of 
the volume’s case studies (see the chapter by Şuhnaz Yilmaz). 
Far better known than his compatriot – mainly for his leadership 
of the Young Turk movement and Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP), and Great War role as the Ottoman Empire’s minister of 
war – Enver also spent time in North Africa immediately prior 
to the First World War helping to organise a number of Libyan 
tribes against the Italian invasion. Like Aref Taher, Enver’s 
aim was not to save Tripolitania from Italy so that it could 
gain its independence, but to keep it within the Ottoman Empire. 
He was also drawn to trans-national Islamist groups and 
networks, in part, because he recognised their potential utility 
to the defence and advancement of Constantinople’s interests 
throughout the North Africa and Middle East. Nevertheless, and 
again like Aref Taher, he was willing to deny and set aside such 
sympathies in pursuit of other opportunities, as he arguably did 
in the early 1920s when he sought Soviet and international 
Communist support for his political ambitions. Unlike Aref 
Taher, however, Enver harboured strong pan-Turkic sympathies, 
sufficient to lead him to break with Moscow and fight to liberate 
the Turkish emirates of Central Asia from Soviet rule.  
 As Moreau and Yilmaz document in their respective chapters, 
Aref Taher Bey and Enver Pasha spent significant parts of their 
careers fighting the spread of European power and influence in 
North Africa and the Middle East. On occasion, this led them to 
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make common cause with a number of Islamist and ethno-
nationalist groups that embraced and pursued anti-colonial 
agendas. Yet arguably neither of them was committed to 
combatting all forms of imperial rule or every empire that held 
territory in the region. They intervened in Tripolitania at the 
behest of the Ottoman government to try to preserve its influence 
over the province. Their anti-colonialism, therefore, was 
selective, expedient and ambiguous. They denounced and fought 
against only Europe’s empires in a belated attempt to defend and 
save their own.  
In contrast to both Aref Taher Bey and Enver Pasha, Mukhtar 
Al-Ayari (see the chapter by Stuart Schaar) was neither an 
Ottoman official nor a military commander nor from an 
aristocratic or affluent family. He was a Tunisian Arab who rose 
to prominence in the protectorate’s nascent trade union movement 
in the inter-war period. After being exposed to Marxist ideology 
and Communist politics while serving in the French army during 
the Great War, he became an active member of a small but 
influential coterie of Tunisian leftist-nationalists. With 
strong personal connections to the Destour Party, he helped 
establish the General Confederation of Tunisian Workers 
(Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens, CGTT) in 
1924, the country’s first indigenous trade union. His 
involvement with the CGTT got him into trouble with the 
protectorate authorities, and in 1925 he was arrested, tried and 
convicted of inciting opposition to French rule. Sentenced to 
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10 years in exile, he travelled first to Cairo and later to 
Paris where he died before ever returning home. 
While also directed against France and Europe’s other 
imperial powers, Al-Ayari’s anti-colonialism was markedly 
different from that of either Aref Taher Bey or Enver Pasha. For 
unlike they, he wanted not to preserve what remained of the 
damaged and dying Ottoman order, but to liberate Tunisians and 
North Africans from all forms of imperial rule by establishing 
a new system of economic relations. For Al-Ayari, class and 
imperialism were synonymous. He drew little distinction between 
either French rule and capitalism, or anti-colonialism and 
socialism. Yet despite being labelled an enemy of the colonial 
order, he accepted one of the key arguments upon which the 
protectorate system was premised: that all human development was 
linear and sequential.19 Like Messali Hadj and other,20 better 
known North African leftist-nationalists of the same period, Al-
Ayari used some of the French authorities’ arguments against 
them. He appropriated ideas and concepts that they drew upon to 
explain and justify their rule in Tunisia and the rest of the 
Maghreb to challenge and expose the legitimacy of their claims 
and power. The extent to which the arrogation of these notions 
and arguments impaired the ability of indigenous nationalists 
to bring an end to colonial rule and imperial power over the 
peoples and territories they represented has long been the 
subject of fierce academic debate.21 Nevertheless, in drawing 
upon them, Al-Ayari and his fellow North African nationalists 
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advanced their respective political causes by exploiting the 
colonial powers’ own definitions and designations. 
West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War is 
primarily a history of the FLN’s activities in the Bonn republic 
during the war of liberation. It begins by considering the 
importance of safe havens and rear bases to insurgent groups and 
factions around the world. As von Bülow notes, such ‘sanctuaries 
mattered because they provided … [these] forces the time, space, 
and security required to build up troops and resources and 
develop effective and durable politico-administrative 
structures’.22 Her book then charts and analyses the increasingly 
vital role West Germany played as an operating base for the FLN 
during the Algerian war of liberation.  
 The importance of other countries as safe havens to the 
FLN’s campaign is widely acknowledged by many existing studies.23 
The contributions of Tunisia and Morocco as staging grounds for 
the ALN are habitually referred to by specialist and general 
histories of the conflict,24 and many other accounts not 
explicitly about the war.25 France is also routinely identified 
as having played host to an array of individuals, groups, 
movements and networks that supported and advanced the cause of 
Algerian independence.26 Similarly, Nasser’s Egypt is frequently 
mentioned as one of the FLN’s earliest and most vocal allies 
from which the group’s uprising was launched.27 Much less 
attention, however, has been paid to other countries and the 
roles their territories played as places in which FLN members 
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and supporters could live and mobilise in comparative safety 
from the French security services. 
 Von Bülow’s is the first in-depth study of West Germany and 
the FLN. In it, she confirms both the importance and singularity 
of the Bonn republic’s contribution to the organisation’s 
campaign. In addition to much needed revenue, the country became 
a vital source of arms and ammunition to the group. Indeed, by 
October 1958, the French army’s external military intelligence 
agency, the deuxième bureau, identified West Germany as one of 
the FLN’s three ‘“principal sources”’ of weapons.28 And while 
the quantity of munitions sourced through the country was never 
as great as that provided by either Czechoslovakia or 
Yugoslavia, the FLN still valued the supply of arms through the 
Bonn republic sufficiently highly to establish its ‘only 
permanent procurement mission outside of the Arab world’ there.29 
 The focus and extensive primary archival research of von 
Bülow’s book make it compelling reading for anyone interested 
in modern Algeria. And it will also appeal to scholars and 
students of the early EU. For in charting the FLN’s growing 
presence in the Bonn republic, it details the effect of the war 
of liberation on Franco-West German relations over this critical 
period in post-war European politics. Throughout much of the 
conflict, Bonn was forced to balance several vital national 
interests. The most important of these was placating and 
appeasing Paris. By the time the uprising began on 1 November 
1954, the West German authorities were fully aware of the extent 
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to which they depended on their neighbour for their security, 
prosperity and ongoing international rehabilitation. And almost 
as important, were the cordial relations they hoped to forge 
with the governments of the growing number of independent ex-
colonies. For they understood that doing so represented one the 
best ways of dissuading the leaders of these states from formally 
recognising East Germany as a separate entity, to maintaining 
the international isolation of the Berlin regime. 
 The war of liberation presented Bonn with a complex and 
protracted dilemma. If it agreed to all of the French 
government’s demands on how it should respond to the FLN members 
operating in its territory, then it risked alienating the 
organisation’s allies in the Middle East and Africa. Yet should 
it fail to keep France onside, then it risked upsetting this 
vital ally and the cohesion of the Western alliance on which it 
relied. But if it upset the FLN’s supporters too much, including 
the governments of the newly independent countries of Tunisia 
and Morocco, then it risked undermining its ability to dissuade 
them from recognising the East Berlin regime. In meticulously 
charting Bonn’s response to the ever-shifting contours of this 
dilemma, von Bülow is the first to expose the true impact of the 
Algerian war of liberation on intra-European relations at this 
time. 
 West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War is also 
ideally organised. Chapter one begins with an overview of the 
developments and forces that led to the establishment of the FLN 
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before explaining the importance of safe havens, sanctuaries and 
rear bases to insurgent groups. Chapters two through five, which 
together comprise part one, then chart and analyse the FLN’s 
growing presence in West Germany from the Federation of France’s 
initial appreciation of the potential opportunities presented 
by the Bonn republic as a base of operations through to the 
creation of the organisation’s procurement and smuggling 
networks there. Chapters six through nine, which together 
comprise part two, then focus on the efforts of the French 
government, intelligence and security services, armed forces and 
authorities in Algeria to contain and counter the FLN’s 
international campaign and activities in West Germany 
specifically. Finally, chapter 10, which comprises part three, 
then looks at what happened to the FLN’s cadres and networks in 
the Bonn republic over the final 18 months of the war of 
liberation. In adopting this structure, the book’s analysis is 
able to be both chronological and thematic. Each part focuses 
on a distinct period of time while every chapter addresses a 
different topic. Thus, Von Bülow can provide a series of highly-
detailed and focused accounts that build on one another and 
develop her thesis while avoiding unnecessary repetition. 
Global Women, Colonial Ports is a history of prostitution 
in North Africa and the Middle East over the inter-war period. 
It begins by focusing on the activities and development of the 
League of Nations’ Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Women 
and Children (CTW). The CTW first met in June 1922 to monitor 
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the implementation of the 1921 International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children. This agreement 
was the outcome of nearly 50 years of escalating European and 
North American concern over what was initially called white 
slavery.30 This circulation of females was increasingly viewed 
by the US and various European governments as a moral hazard 
both to the individuals involved and the societies in which they 
lived and worked. In particular, prostitution was seen as a key 
contributory cause to a range of serious health and social 
problems that affected all parts of the Mediterranean region. 
The remainder of the book then examines the ways in which the 
French and British authorities in Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon, 
Egypt and Palestine tried to address these issues by managing 
the lives and bodies of the women and girls whom they thought 
were, at least in part, responsible. 
While the local colonial authorities in each of the urban 
centres examined by Kozma had their own approach to managing 
these women, an especially noteworthy difference existed between 
the methods used by French officers and their British 
counterparts. With their colleagues in Morocco arguably at the 
forefront, French administrators sought and exercised far 
greater control over the prostitutes based in their locales than 
did any of their British peers. As Kozma carefully details, the 
women and girls working in Tunis, Beirut and, above all, 
Casablanca were subject to extensive and invasive controls that, 
once in force, they found hard to have lifted. This difference 
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reflected the competing views of the French and British empires 
on how best to stop the spread of venereal disease within their 
territories and amongst their armed forces. And while Britain’s 
approach might have been less intrusive, that of France was more 
effective at safeguarding the health of prostitutes and their 
clients. 
With its carefully developed and substantiated thesis, 
Global Women, Colonial Ports is essential reading for scholars 
and students of European colonial rule in North Africa and the 
Levant in the early twentieth century. In detailing both the 
ways in which the French and British authorities tried to manage 
the prostitutes based in their respective territories and their 
reasons for doing so, Kozma provides a detailed account of a 
specific form of imperial control that spans the macro and micro 
levels. For the health of these women directly affected that of 
their clients, many of whom were soldiers, sailors and 
functionaries in the service of one or other European empire. 
Thus, as Kozma shows, the colonial authorities believed that the 
stability and efficiency of their rule in the Mediterranean 
rested in part on monitoring and disciplining this group of 
females. 
 Global Women, Colonial Ports will also appeal to academics 
and students working in the field of postcolonialism. For in 
explaining how and why the French and British authorities sought 
to control these women and girls, Kozma highlights the complex 
interplay of several types of relation that can be described as 
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colonial. A key reason for the different approaches to managing 
prostitutes in their overseas territories taken by France and 
Britain was the degree of influence each country’s feminist 
movement had on imperial policy. And just as domestic gender 
relations affected colonial rule in North Africa, the Middle 
East and elsewhere, so the perceived needs of empire fed into 
the debates over women’s rights taking place at home. Kozma not 
only highlights the parallels between the imperial powers’ 
treatment of women and minorities in their own societies and 
conduct towards the populations of their overseas territories, 
but also confirms the extent to which practices of control were 
exercised, developed and shared right their empires. Thus, she 
contributes to the longstanding crucial debate in 
postcolonialism over what constitutes colonial rule and whether 
it has ended. 
Global Women, Colonial Ports is also well organised, 
drawing together three complementary lines of analysis. The 
first is thematic as each of its five chapters tackles a 
different topic. Chapter one traces the origins and development 
of the international legal and political environment in which 
the book is set. Chapter two looks at the regulatory regimens 
established by the French and British colonial authorities in a 
series of North African and Middle Eastern urban centres. 
Chapter three examines how and why women and girls moved around 
the Mediterranean to work as prostitutes and the measures taken 
by the imperial powers to monitor and stop them. Chapter four 
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considers the medical concerns and responses of the French and 
British authorities in these urban centres. And finally, chapter 
five charts the development of the feminist-led campaigns to 
abolish the regulatory regimens and end prostitution in Europe’s 
imperial territories. The second line of enquiry is temporal as 
each theme corresponds to a successive stage in the prostitution 
network. And the third line is geographic as the book’s focus 
shifts from Europe to North Africa to the Levant and back to 
Europe. In taking these lines of enquiry, Kozma is able both to 
provide a detailed and comprehensive account of the phenomenon 
of trans-national prostitution in the Mediterranean in the early 
twentieth century and reconstruct the main political and civil 
debates that took place in Europe over the working lives and 
treatment of the women involved.  
Subversives and Mavericks in the Muslim Mediterranean is a 
collection of essays on the lives and careers of a series of 
figures who rejected and resisted European influence and rule 
in North Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. While most of these individuals shared the same broad 
concerns over the implications and effects of this outside 
interference on the development and direction of their 
respective societies, the specific causes of their opposition, 
and forms that their resistance took, varied considerably. Some 
of the figures examined in the book – most notably Al-Najim bin 
Mubarak bin Mas͑ud, Aref Taher Bey and Enver Pasha (see the 
chapters by Odile Moreau, Wilfred Rollman and Şuhnaz Yilmaz) – 
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were soldiers and military commanders who fought against the 
invading forces of France and Italy. Their opposition was 
violent, public and in the service of incumbent Muslim leaders 
(the sultans of Morocco and the Ottoman Empire).  
Other of the individuals examined in the volume – including 
Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi and Mukhtar Al-Ayari (see the chapters 
by Sanaa Makhlouf and Stuart Schaar) – were political activists 
who developed and propounded alternative visions of Arab society 
that began with bringing an end to European influence over North 
Africa and the wider Middle East. While their respective plans 
for the region were almost entirely different, they each wanted 
to create a new order rather than try to salvage or rebuild what 
Europe’s imperial powers had taken over and, at least partially, 
dismantled. In different ways, their opposition was ambitious, 
sweeping and intellectual, pursued on behalf not of a 
dispossessed ruling elite, but national and religious imagined 
communities. 
And still other of the figures studied in the book – in 
particular Boubeker El-Ghanjaoui, Nazli Hanem, Kmar Bayya and 
Khiriya Bin Ayyad, and Tahar Darghouth and Lilia Djemma (see the 
chapters by Khalid Ben-Srhir, Leïla Blili and Julia Clancy-
Smith) – were intermediaries, aristocrats and ordinary people 
who, in pursuing their personal goals, challenged prevailing 
social structures and norms. Unlike the others examined in this 
book, none of these figures openly or consistently denounced the 
European powers. Of humble origins, Boubeker El-Ghanjaoui 
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acquired wealth and prestige representing the interests of the 
Moroccan crown and British Legation in Tangier. Nazli Hanem and 
Khiriya Bin Ayyad exploited the comparative freedoms afforded 
women in Western Europe to argue for the reform of the Ottoman 
Empire. And Lilia Djemma took full advantage of what educational 
opportunities were available to her in the French protectorate 
of Tunisia to pursue a career not normally open to either women 
or those from her socio-economic background. Thus, their 
opposition was largely a corollary of their pursuit of other 
goals which their respective social circumstances made difficult 
to achieve. 
Subversives and Mavericks in the Muslim Mediterranean will 
appeal most directly to academics and students interested in 
early resistance to the expansion and entrenchment of European 
rule in North Africa and the wider Middle East. Together, the 
volume’s essays highlight novel ways in which the members of 
colonised societies were able to oppose and subvert imperial 
power. They confirm that effective resistance could take any 
form and be mounted by anyone. It was not limited to dramatic 
acts or grand gestures. Nor was it pursued solely by or for 
great men. In adding this nuance and subtlety, and in providing 
real-world examples of the range of colonial relations that 
exist, the volume will also be of interest to those working in 
the field of postcolonialism. 
The volume is also effectively organised. Its eight essays 
are grouped together in two parts of unequal length. Part one 
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includes the chapters on Boubeker El-Ghanjaoui (Ben Srhir), Aref 
Taher Bey (Moreau), Nazli Hanem, Kmar Bayya and Khiriya Bin 
Ayyad (Blili), Al-Najim bin Mubarak bin Mas͑ud (Rollman), and 
Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (Makhlouf), while part two comprises 
those of Emver Pasha (Yilmaz), Tahar Darghouth and Lilia Djemma 
(Clancy-Smith) and Mukhtar Al-Ayari (Schaar). Each part broadly 
mirrors the organisation and content of the other. In both, the 
chapters are arranged in broadly chronological order. And each 
includes essays on figures who engaged in different types of 
resistance. In adopting this structure, Moreau and Schaar are 
able to emphasise the interconnectedness of the region. By not 
ordering the chapters on the basis of country – which would have 
been difficult given the amount of travel in which so many of 
the figures examined engaged – the volume highlights the high 
degree to which the different parts of the Mediterranean were 
bound together.  
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